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Since the beginning of the 1980s, the world has undergone a major shift in thinking about the
appropriate economic role of the state. Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) has been
at the core of this change ever since Britain and France initiated privatization planning. In the
last two decades, several countries have launched ambitious privatization programs. Although
the extent, form, and pace of change have varied from country to country, the general trend has
been similar: the state has gradually withdrawn from directly producing goods and services. 
Despite the existence of this phenomenon, we still have little empirical knowledge about
how well privatization works in practice.  Few studies have analyzed the impact of privatization.
Early empirical research found mixed results regarding the relative performance of private versus
public firms (see Caves, 1990; Vining and Boardman, 1992). More recent research finds private
ownership to be generally more efficient than public ownership (cf. e.g., Megginson, Nash, and
Van Randerborgh, 1994). These studies focus only on the question of productive efficiency.
Recently, however, La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) studied the Mexico-wide privatization
experience of the 1980s and early 1990s. They analyze how privatization changed the
performance of SOEs over a broad set of outcomes. Additionally, these authors consider the
possibility that the increased profitability of privatized companies exacted a social cost in terms
of higher prices or layoffs. 
In this paper, we follow La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) to evaluate the Argentine
privatization program. Thus, we study the effects of privatization on profitability, operating
efficiency, productivity, output, investment, employment, wages and prices. The structure of the
Argentine public firms, however, was very different from those in the privatized Mexican public
sector. In Argentina, the state mostly owned a few large natural monopolies. In Mexico, the state
ran a large number of firms across several productive sectors. Thus, although both privatization
programs have been massive, the Mexican experience is richer in the number of cases compared
to the Argentine one, though the Argentine privatization program was enormous relative to the
size of the economy. Mexico privatized around 1,000 firms of various sizes spread out all over
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Sturzenegger provided excellent research assistance.the economy, but some of the largest public companies such as PEMEX or the electricity
companies have not been privatized. Argentina, on the other hand privatized a smaller number of
firms of much larger average size (cf. e.g., Galiani and Petrecolla, 1996; Galiani and Petrecolla,
2000; Lustig, 1992).
The particular features of the Argentine privatization process allow us to study the direct
impact of privatization in sectors in which, as the state was a monopolist, the whole industry was
transferred to the private sector. In those cases, laid-off workers may lack the possibility of
utilizing their sector-specific human capital in other firms of the economy, or consumers may
lack the possibility of being supplied by other providers. Rather than restricting attention only to
the impact of privatizations on firms, we measure the direct impact of privatization on
consumers’ and workers’ welfare.
We propose two direct measures of the welfare impact of privatizations. First, the
Argentine program involved the privatization of local water and sewerage firms. Changes in
population health associated with these privatizations would provide a measure of the impact of
privatization that goes beyond transfers of consumer surplus. We evaluate how the privatization
of local water and sewerage firms affected both access to these services and child mortality.
Second, the Argentine program involved massive layoffs. Profitability gains in privatized firms
may have been obtained at the expense of workers (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). We measure
the effect of privatizations on workers’ wages by comparing the before and after wages of a
random sample of laid-off workers from the former state oil company (YPF) with a matched
counterfactual group built using micro data gathered from an ongoing household survey. 
Thus, in this paper we address three questions: 
1)  How did privatization affect the performance of firms and through which
channels, i.e., market power or productivity gains? 
2)  Are there direct welfare impacts of privatization that can be rigorously
identified in an econometric sense? In particular, has the privatization of
water and sewerage services improved or worsened population health?  
3)  Part of the efficiency gains of privatized firms may have come from the
breach of explicit and implicit contracts between workers and firms. What
is the evidence of this for Argentina? What has been the effect of the
privatization of YPF on laid-off workers’ earnings?The purpose of this paper is therefore to assess the efficiency as well as some significant
distributional impacts of the Argentine privatization program. This is done by considering
privatization as a policy instrument and by exploiting the fact that exposure to the privatization
process of a group of economic units (i.e., SOEs, public banks, households and workers) varied
both by unit and by year. Thus, we exploit a similar statistical identification strategy to document
some of the costs and benefits of privatization. Although we are not able to identify all of the
efficiency and distributional impacts of privatization by applying this treatment-and-control-
group approach, our main contribution to the literature is to document causal effects of
privatization on measures of efficiency and distribution.
2
Our results show that the profitability of the non-financial firms increased after
privatization. Both operating income to sales and net income to sales increased significantly as a
result of privatization. Large increases in operating efficiency underpin these gains in
profitability. Thus, we find overall a huge increase in the operating efficiency of privatized firms
in Argentina. Employment cuts, however, play a significant role. Employment decreased
approximately 40 percent as a result of privatization. Labor productivity not only increased
because employment decreased, but also because privatized firms increased production.
Regarding the impact of privatization on investment, all the measures analyzed are positively and
significantly affected by privatization. Investment itself increased by at least 350 percent as a
result of privatization. This result is consistent with the view that one of the main motives to sell
the SOEs in Argentina was to re-establish investment. Finally, we do not find any statistically
significant effect of privatization on prices. In the post-privatization period, prices did not
decrease, although the efficiency gains we document entail that they should have fallen if the
quality improvements were not large enough. 
Contrary to the case of non-financial firms, we do not find overall large increases in
operating efficiency after the privatization of public banks. However, some indicators of
efficiency performed well because of privatization. Output per employee increased 20 percent
while the average number of employees per branch decreased 37 percent as a result of
privatization. As in the case of the non-financial firms, employment cuts are a big part of the
                                                     
2 Although several studies describe the privatization process in Argentina, none of them attempts to identify the
causal effects of privatization on broad measures of performance (see, for example, Gerchunoff, 1992; FIEL, 1999;
and Galiani and Petrecolla, 2000). story. Employment decreased approximately 36 percent because of privatization. Thus, on
several indicators, the privatized banks seem to be more efficient after privatization than before.
Finally, the average capitalization ratio (Net Worth/Assets) increased 5 percent due to
privatization. The higher capitalization rate of the privatized banks means a more solvent system,
which is quite important in countries as vulnerable to external shocks as Argentina. 
In terms of the direct measures of welfare analyzed, we find a negative and statistically
significant effect of the privatization of water services on child mortality. The estimated
coefficient implies a decrease of approximately 5 percent in child mortality rates induced by the
privatization of water provision. Turning to our estimate of the earnings losses of displaced
workers, it appears that there is a huge redistribution cost associated with the privatizations of
SOEs. These substantial earning losses due to displacement amount to approximately 50 percent
of the real earnings of the workers before privatization, after taking unemployment into account.
This paper analyzes the effects of privatization on several measures of firm performance,
and on consumers’ and employees’ welfare. It should be taken into account that we perform a
partial equilibrium analysis. This paper does not evaluate general equilibrium effects of the
massive privatization program implemented in Argentina.
3 Indeed, it would be possible to argue
that the current macroeconomic crisis that the country is suffering is to some extent related to the
previous privatization policies. For example, if the privatization package distorted the
equilibrium path of the exchange rate, it could have induced a severe and unsustainable
misallocation of resources in the economy. Moreover, the debt financing of the acquisitions
contributed to the deep increase in the country’s indebtedness. In addition, the massive layoffs
associated with privatization undoubtedly contributed to the sharp increase in unemployment.
However, rather than a macroeconomic study, we conduct an exclusively microeconomic
analysis of the industries and markets in which privatization took place. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we document the Argentine privatization
program. In Section 3, we present the sample of privatized firms. Sections 4 and 5 present the
results of the effect of privatization on the performance of both financial and non-financial firms.
Lastly, we study some direct welfare impacts of privatization. In Section 6, we evaluate the
impact of the privatization of water and sewerage companies on both access to these services and
                                                     
3 Additionally, the numerous accusations of corruption associated with the privatization of the Argentine public
firms are excluded from our analysis.child mortality. Section 7 examines the impact of privatization on the earning losses of long-term
displaced workers. Finally, Section 8 presents our conclusions.
2.  The Argentine Privatization Program
In 1989, Argentina was in the midst of an acute bout of hyperinflation driven by the
monetization of large fiscal deficits. The newly appointed administration launched an ambitious
privatization program in Argentina. This program included most SOEs, as well as other state
assets that were not operated as independent firms (cf. e.g., Galiani and Petrecolla, 1996; Galiani
and Petrecolla, 2000; and Heymann and Kosacoff, 2000). The Argentine privatization program
was quite remarkable in terms of its extent and speed. It was launched together with other deep
structural reforms, such as financial and trade liberalization, the implementation of a monetary
currency board in 1991 (Plan de Convertibilidad), the emancipation of the Central Bank, the
decentralization of the health and education services, and other pro-market actions such as a
general deregulation of economic activities. 
Deriving fiscal revenues from the privatization of the SOEs was a crucial component of
the stabilization programs launched by the newly elected government. According to Gerchunoff
(1992), the main objective of the privatization program, at least at the beginning, was to solve the
(intertemporal) fiscal problems. There were also specific company-related reasons driving the
privatization process. After a long period of negative net investment, the companies needed high
levels of capital investment to improve both the quality of and access to their services. The
public sector had way to fund those investments. In addition to its direct effects, the privatization
program signaled a clear change in the direction of the country’s economic development. 
SOEs in Argentina were, mainly, large vertically integrated natural monopolies. Because
of these characteristics Argentina privatized a small number of very large firms, and the
Argentine privatization program was huge relative to the size of the economy. Under the
objective of raising privatization revenues, in many sectors the authorities decided to maintain a
monopolistic structure in order to make the new private companies more attractive to the
potential buyers. With the same objective, prices were raised in the immediate pre-privatization
period. The tax structures under which the new companies were to operate were simplified.
Moreover, the liabilities of the companies were absorbed by the state before transferring them to
private hands. In addition, the new companies enjoyed considerable “regulatory freedom” at theoutset of the program. The creation of the relevant regulatory agencies was delayed or neglected
during the early years of the privatization program.
The transfer of companies and assets to private control took several forms, such as total
sale through open international auctions, concessions, public offerings of shares, licensing, leases
with or without purchase options, management contracts, and the issue of exploration permits.
The government obtained revenue in the form of cash and external debt bonds. Moreover, a
positive fiscal impact resulted from a reduction in current losses, which had been previously
financed by the public budget, and a positive flow of taxes from the privatized companies. Table
1 presents the revenues from privatizations per sector in federal and provincial transfers
according to Ministerio de Economía (2000). The table shows the income for every sale (annual
canons paid for concessions are not included).
Table 1. Privatization Revenues (by sector)
Source: Ministerio de Economía (2000). Other revenues include the use of trusts and liabilities assumed by the
companies.





(Mil. USD) (Mil. USD) (Mil. USD) (Mil. USD) (Mil. USD)
Federal Privatizations
Petroleum and Gas 7,594 0.391 6,716 878 - 1,271
Electricity 3,908 0.201 1,989 1,451 468 2,586
Communications 2,982 0.154 2,279 703 - 5,150
Gas 2,950 0.152 1,553 1,397 - 3,116
Transport 756 0.039 284 183 290 1,314
Petrochemical 438 0.023 418 20 - 132
Banks and Financial 
    Services 394 0.020 394 - - -
Steel 158 0.008 143 14 - 30
Deriv. From Petroleum
    and Gas 116 0.006 116 - - -
Pipelines 77 0.004 77 - - -
Construction 20 0.001 20 - - -
Other Manuf. Industries 11 0.001 11 - - -
Hotels and Restaurants 8 0.000 3 5 - 13
Chemical 5 0.000 3 2 - 3
Electronics 2 0.000 1 - 1 1
Agriculture 2 0.000 2 - - -
Total Federal 19,422 14,009 4,653 759 13,615
Provincial Privatizations
Electricity 2,085 0.471 2,068 - 18 -
Petroleum and Gas 1,703 0.385 1,703 - - -
Water and Sewages 589 0.133 589 - - -
Paper 50 0.011 50 - - -
Total Provincial 4,427 4,410 - 18 -Figure 1 shows the accumulation of privatization revenues during the decade. 80.9
percent of the total income from privatizations was obtained in the period 1990-94. Mostly small
companies and some residual shares of large companies were sold in the second half of the
decade.
Figure 1.
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3.  The Sample
According to the official statistics (CEP, 1998 and Central Bank (BCRA)), 154 privatization
contracts were signed during the 1990s. However, the sample of privatized SOEs that will be
analyzed in our study is smaller than the number of signed contracts for several reasons:
1)  Several SOEs were split vertically and horizontally into smaller units or
assets, and privatized separately. In the majority of these cases, it is not
possible to obtain pre-privatization financial statements and performance
indicators reported separately according to the criteria used to break up the
SOEs.
4 This reduces the number of observations, since our unit of analysis has
to be the SOE and not the private companies that emerged from the process.
                                                     
4 The only exemption was Ferrocarriles Argentinos, the railway public enterprise. The company was divided into 11
units (operating lines or corridors) given in concession, and it was possible to find data by business unit for the pre-
privatization period.2)  Concessions of roads, freeways and docks cannot be analyzed since there are
no financial statements available for the pre-privatization period. Roads,
freeways and docks were not organized as companies under public ownership.
3)  The sale of state minority participation in private companies is not considered
in our study since the privatization itself did not imply a change in
management objectives of those firms. 
4)  Within the oil sector, some contracts involved exploration permits of areas
where the state oil company (YPF) did not operate before (areas petroleras
marginales).
5)  Several SOEs were liquidated or ceased operation.
6)  In a few cases, data for the SOEs are not available.
Our sample is drawn from the universe of privatization contracts. We have been able to
collect data for 21 non-financial federal SOEs and for all the privatized banks. Our database for
non-financial SOEs accounts for 81.7 percent of the state income from the sale of companies that
continued operating as private, separate companies after being privatized, and 72.4 percent of the
total income from sales.
5 Appendix 1 describes the industrial structure and the data sources for
the sectors included in our study. 
As stated above, our unit of analysis is the SOE. Therefore, we aggregate the information
from all the companies that resulted from the privatization of each SOE, with the exception of
the railway SOE, Ferrocarriles Argentinos, for which it was possible to find data by business
unit for the pre-privatization period. Table 2 presents the set of non-financial companies included
in our study.
                                                     
5 The income from concessions is not considered in these calculations. Aguas Argentinas and the railway companies
were privatized in this manner. Information on total income from concessions is not available.Table 2. Non-Financial Companies Included in Our Database
State Owned Company




Obras Sanitarias Aguas Argentinas 88/92 93/97
Telefónica ENTEL Telecom 85/90 91/99
Trenes de Buenos Aires
Metrovías
Ferrovías
Transp. Metropolitanos Gral. Roca
Transp. Metropolitanos Gral. San Martín

















Aerolíneas Argentinas Aerolíneas Argentinas 86/89 92/94
TGS
TGN
Dist. de gas Metropolitana
Dist. de gas Buenos Aires Norte
Dist. de gas Noroeste
Dist. de gas del Centro
Dist. de gas del Litoral
Dist. de gas Cuyana
Dist. de gas Pampeana
Gas del Estado
Dist. de gas del Sur
87/92 93/99
YPF YPF 87/90 91/99
Transener













SOMISA SIDERAR 87/91 95/98
Encotel Correo Argentino 89/96 97/00
Tandanor Tandanor 88/91 94/99A group of smaller non-financial privatized firms is not considered in our study for the
reasons set forth in the following table:
Table 3. Non-Financial Privatizations Not Included in Our Database
Divested Assets from YPF Ceased or Liquidated Not Operating as Companies
in Public Period
Information not Found
86 oil marginal areas Astillero Domecq Garcia Administración General de
Puertos (AGP) - 6 Docks.
Altos Hornos Zapla 
Area Petrolera Aguaragüe Carboquímica Argentina Elevador Terminal del Puerto
de Quequen
Canal 11
Area Petrolera El Huemul -
Koluel Kaike
Elevadores Puerto de Buenos
Aires
Canal 13
Area Petrolera Palmar Largo
Fabricaciones Militares
(Acido Sulfúrico, de armas





ELMA Elevadores Terminales de
Rosario
Fabricaciones Militares
(San Martin, ECA, Tolueno
Sintético, Área Militar
Córdoba)
Area Petrolera Santa Cruz I Empresa de Desarrollos
Especiales
Highways Hipódromo Argentino
Area Petrolera Santa Cruz II Entesa Hotel Llao Llao Interbaires
Area Petrolera Tierra del
Fuego
Forja Argentina Navigation waterways Petroquímica Bahía Blanca
Area Petrolera Tordillo  Hipasam Unidad Portuaria San Pedro Radio Belgrano
Area Petrolera Vizcacheras Induclor
Buques Tanque (YPF) Intesa
Destilería Dock Sud (YPF) Radio Excelsior
Destilería San Lorenzo (YPF) Satecna
Oleoductos del Valle (YPF –
70%)
Sidinox
Planta de Aerosoles Dock
Sud (YPF)
Sisteval
Puerto Rosales (YPF - 70%) Sitea
Refinería Campo Durán Tanque Argentino Mediano
Tecnología AeroespacialFinally, we construct a separate database for the banking sector, where for regulatory
reasons we have monthly data for an extended number of variables, and where we have a control
group composed of non-privatized public banks and private banks. The privatized provincial
banks are set forth in the following table:
Table 4. Privatized Banks Included in Our Database
Bank Privatization Date Number of Available Monthly Observations
Pre-Privatization  Post-Privatization
Caja de Ahorro Mar-94 8 62
Chaco Nov-94 14 58
Entre Ríos Jan-95 17 57
Formosa Dec-95 29 45
Misiones Jan-96 23 23
Río Negro Mar-96 30 41
Salta Mar-96 31 43
Tucumán Jul-96 35 39
San Luis Aug-96 37 25
Santiago del Estero Sep-96 38 36
San Juan Nov-96 34 34
Previsión Social de Mendoza* Nov-96 41 18
Mendoza* Nov-96 41 27
Jujuy Feb-98 47 20
Municipal de Tucumán Aug-98 60 14
Santa Cruz Dec-98 53 10
Santa Fe Jan-99 50 9
Notes:
* In May-98, the Bank of Mendoza acquired the privatized Banco de Previsión Social de Mendoza.
4.  Non-Financial Firms
With the objective of analyzing the costs and benefits of privatization, in this section we study
the effects of privatization of non-financial firms on several measures of firm performance,
including: profitability, operating efficiency, productivity, output, investment, employment,
wages and prices.  
Suppose one is interested in estimating the influence of a policy instrument on an
outcome for a group – in our case, for example, the effect of privatization on productivity. Thus,
the group consists of State-Owned Enterprises i = 1…N observed over a sample horizon t =
1…T. Suppose further that the policy instrument (i.e., the privatization of a firm) changes in aparticular period t for a segment of the group (or, as in our case, that it changes for all the SOEs
but at different points in time). Let dPit  be a zero-one indicator that equals unity if the
privatization was operative for firm i in period t. Firms of the group that experience privatization
react according to a parameter α. The standard statistical model to estimate α is the following
two-way fixed effect error component model:
6
it i t it it ε µ λ dP α y + + + = (1)
where µi is a time-invariant effect unique to firm i, which also captures industry differences; λt is
a time effect common to all firms in period t; and εit is an individual time-varying error
distributed independently across individuals and time and independently of all µi and λt (cf.
Chamberlain, 1984; Heckman and Robb, 1985). 
The behavior of the difference estimator of α provides the answers the question in which
we are interested: how the expected value of a specific variable y (i.e., the dependent variable in
equation (1) changes in any period if the SOE is privatized. Thus, α = E(yit | dPit = 1) – E(yit | dPit
= 0) for all i and t. This estimator assumes that the mean change in the privatized and non-
privatized firms is the same. Thus, the change in the outcome measured in the comparison group
serves to benchmark common period effects among SOEs. 
As explained in the previous section, even though all the SOEs in our data set were
privatized, this occurred at different points in time.
7 The Argentine privatization program
induced some exogenous variation in the transfer of enterprises across SOEs and time. Thus, our
identification strategy exploits the fact that exposure to privatization varied by both firm and
year.
8
As we do not have information for the whole period for every company, our 21 non-
financial firms comprise an unbalanced panel.
                                                     
6 Possibly including a set of control regressors that vary across both units and time.
7 As explained before, some small privatized firms are not included in our data set. However, even if we had
information on those small privatizations, the appropriateness of pooling small and large firms in our econometric
analysis would be disputable. 
8 Naturally, the number of observations included in the control group each year decreases every time a firm is
privatized. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that if the statistical model specified to identify the impact of
privatization on the random variable y is correct, this is not an issue.   Table 5. Number of Companies by Year in Our Data Set
Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Public 1 4 7 10 15 14 18 14 1 1 1 1
Private 2 4 18 19 19 18 19 18 16 1
We are interested in analyzing the change in performance of our sample of firms
following privatization. We rely on six broad indicators of performance: (1) profitability, (2)
operating efficiency, (3) employment and wages, (4) capital investment, (5) total output, and (6)
prices. Appendix 2 describes our variables. We express nominal variables in 1999 pesos,
deflating them by the aggregate CPI index.
9 
Following La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999), we calculate two profitability ratios:
operating income to sales and net income to sales. Evaluating changes in operating income offers
a superior measure of efficiency gains, whereas evaluating changes in net income provides a
useful summary statistic of the full impact of privatization on the performance of the SOEs. We
could also have evaluated the impact of privatization on the ratio of operating (net) income to
fixed assets but our measure of fixed assets (PPE) is not reliable because of the difficulties in
consistently measuring PPE in periods of extreme price instability. It is observed that PPE
adjusts dramatically downwards after privatization. Moreover, it is likely that PPE could have
been overstated in the SOEs’ balance sheets because the cost of public investment projects had
been extremely high. 
We also examine three indicators of operating efficiency to capture changes in the ability
of firms to produce output from any given level of inputs (cf. La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes,
1999). We compute the logarithm of unit costs, defined as the ratio of cost of labor and
intermediate inputs to sales; the logarithm of sales per employee; and the logarithm of output per
employee. 
We also analyze the impact of privatization on labor variables: the logarithm of total
employment and the logarithm of real average wages. In order to assess the impact of
                                                     
9  For several variables, however, the data for the year 1989 is not entirely reliable because there are severe
difficulties in producing consistent balance sheet accounts in periods of extreme price instability. We have detected
some outliers in 1989. Naturally, there are other outliers dispersed across the data set.  privatization on capital formation, we examine the level of investment.
10 Here, we consider the
logarithm of investment, the logarithm of investment to sales, the logarithm of investment to
total employment, and the logarithm of investment to fixed assets (PPE). Finally, we examine the
behavior of output and prices.   
Before analyzing the impact of privatization on these indicators, we need to discuss some
econometric issues. Although it is customary to study the influence of a policy instrument on a
(conditional) mean outcome, it is advisable in our case to also study the influence of privatization
on the (conditional) median of the distribution of the firm performance indicators studied. 
Let:
it i t it it ε µ λ dP α y θ θ θ θ + + + = (2)
with Qθ(yit| dPit, t, i) = αθ dPit + λθt + µθi, where Qθ(yit| dPit, t, i) denotes the θth conditional
quantile of y given dP for a given unit i and period t. This is the quantile regression model of
Koenker and Basset (1978). The quantile regression model is concerned with the distribution of a
scalar random variable y conditional on a vector of covariates x  where the θ-quantile of y
conditional on x is a linear function in x. For example, consider the case where θ equals 0.5. This
is the median regression. This estimator is obtained by minimizing the sum of absolute errors and
is referred as the least absolute deviation (LAD) estimator.
The LAD estimator is a robust alternative to the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator
for estimating the parameters of a linear regression function.
11 A potentially serious problem in
our data set is the presence of severe “outliers” in many of the measures of firm performance
under analysis. The LAD estimator protects us against outliers in the dependent random variable
y and is preferable over the OLS estimator in this respect. 
Additionally, the impact of privatization on any outcome considered in our study is likely
to be heterogeneous across SOEs. Furthermore, this heterogeneity is unlikely to be successfully
parameterized. Thus, the OLS estimate of α in equation (1) is probably to estimate a mixture of
                                                     
10 We do not attempt to measure directly the impact of privatization on the stock of fixed assets because of the
severe measurement errors in this variable already discussed. 
11  In this context, robust connotes a certain flexibility of the statistical procedures to deviations from the
distributional assumptions of the hypothesized models (see Koenker and Bassett, 1978).different population parameters (different privatization impacts across industries) with a severely
skewed distribution. The median impact of privatization on any outcome will be less influenced
by extreme observations (impacts) than the mean impact of privatization on any outcome. Thus,
the impacts of privatization on any performance indicator are likely to be better represented on
its median than on its mean. In that case, equation (2) could instead be estimated with θ equal to
0.5 and the consequent redefinition of the parameter of interest. 
The heterogeneity of impacts of privatization across SOEs also leads us to study the
percentage change of any variable y with respect to privatization instead of the level impact of
privatization on these variables whenever that is practical.
12 We think it is reasonable to assume
that the former parameter is much less heterogeneous across industries that the latter one.
Turning now to the results, it is first worth noting that the profitability of privatized firms
increased dramatically in the post-privatization period. The SOEs in our sample were highly
unprofitable during the pre-privatization period. La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) find
similar results for Mexico. Table 6 shows simple before and after comparisons for the mean and
median operating income to sales and net income to sales ratios. Both profitability performances
show statistically significant jumps after privatization. The huge differences that exist between
the mean and median statistics, especially in the pre-privatization period, suggest that the
parameter (of interest) in equation (2) is more appealing than the one in equation (1).   



















-0.579 -0.158 2.59 *** -0.100 0.055 4.32 ***
Net income
to sales
-0.479 0.030 3.49 *** -0.157 0.040 15.90 ***
*** Statistically different from zero at the 0.01 level of significance. The number of observations is 170. 
                                                     
12 The percentage change of any variable y with respect to privatization is given by 100 [Exponential(α) – 1], where
α is the estimated coefficient in the regression functions (1) or (2). In Table 7, we report the estimate of the impacts of privatization on both the conditional
mean and the conditional median of the set of indicators we propose to analyze. Thus, we report
the difference in difference estimates of the impact of privatization on the set of indicators
proposed. The distinction between these estimates and the before and after estimates reported in
Table 6 is that the difference in difference estimates also controls for the common aggregate
effects (year effects) on the dependent variable studied. We confirm the significant increase in
profitability after privatization. Both operating income to sales and net income to sales increased
substantially as a result of privatization. This result and, indeed, all the results reported in Table
7, are qualitatively robust to the parameter analyzed (mean or median).Table 7. Changes in Performance for the Sample of Non-Financial Privatized Firms
Variable Number of
observations
Mean Regressions Median Regressions
I. Profitability






























































(i)  All regressions include year and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
(ii)  *** Statistically different from zero at the 0.01 level of significance. ** Statistically different from
zero at the 0.05 level of significance. * Statistically different from zero at the 0.1 level of significance.
(iii)  For each firm, we exclude from the sample the observation for the year in which the company was
privatized due to the lack of reliable data during the transition period. Results are pretty much the same
if we also exclude the two years before privatization.
(iv)  None of the results changes qualitatively if we exclude from the analysis the data for 1989. In general,
rather, the estimates become more precise.  
(v)  Obviously, the observations for 1985 and 2000 are excluded from the estimated regression functions
since the models include year effects. 
(vi)  The number of observations varies across regressions because there is not information for all variables
for every firm during the sample period. Large increases in operating efficiency underpin these gains in profitability. The impact
of privatization on the (conditional) median unit costs shows a reduction of the latter of 10
percent. This effect is close to the effect found by La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) for
Mexico. The impact of privatization on (conditional) mean unit costs, however, is implausibly
large. Most likely, it shows the pervasive upshot of extreme effects in some SOEs. As this occurs
with other variables as well, we emphasize the results of the impacts of privatization on the
conditional median of the performance measures studied, although none of the reported results
change qualitatively if we do so. The median sales to employment ratio also increases 10 percent
because of the privatization of the SOEs. Finally, the impact of privatization on labor
productivity, measured by the ratio of production to total employment is dramatic. The impact of
privatization on the median level of productivity shows an increase of 46 percent. Thus, overall
we find a huge boost in the operating efficiency of the privatized firms in Argentina.
As in the Mexican case, employment cuts are a big part of the story. Employment
decreased approximately 40 percent as a result of privatization. It is likely that this figure
underestimates the layoffs experienced by privatized firms because in some SOEs, employment
was already falling during the immediate pre-privatization period. For example, a significant
proportion of the layoffs in YPF occurred two years before the privatization of that firm.
13
Nevertheless, our results show that a substantial proportion of the layoffs occurred after the firms
were privatized.
Labor productivity not only increased because employment decreased, but also because
privatized firms increased production. The median level of production increased 25 percent
because of privatization. 
The impact of privatization on the real average wage for a pool of workers is unlikely to
be identified because the composition of workers’ human capital is liable to change with the
layoffs associated to privatizations. On the one hand, many workers were laid off in early
retirement plans and hence, on average, SOE workers had more tenure than the average
remaining worker in the privatized firms.
14 Additionally, clientelistic employment positions
                                                     
13 In Section 7, we study in detail the impact of privatization on workers laid off from YPF.
14 For example, in the case of YPF, a random sample of laid-off workers shows that, in 1991, just before the
privatization of the firm in 1993, the mean (median) age of these laid-off workers was 43 (43) years while the mean
(median) age of the employees in the manufacturing sector was 34 (33) years (Household Survey, all urban
agglomerates). Furthermore, in 1991 only 10 percent of the laid-off workers from YPF were younger than 30
compared to 43 percent of the employees in the manufacturing sector.  disappeared because of privatization and these positions had probably been rewarded an above-
average wage. On the other hand, casual evidence shows that managers’ real wages increased
substantially because the privatized firms had to pay competitive wages to attract skilled
executives to replace the prior politically appointed SOEs’ directors. Thus, when we consider the
impact of privatization on average wages at the firm level, the fixed effect assumption of the
difference in difference estimators breaks down as the composition of the workers’ human
capital has likely changed with the privatization of the SOEs. Nevertheless, the estimated impact
of privatization on average real wages seems to be negative or nil.
15 There appears to be huge
variability in this impact across firms reaffirming our suspicion that the identified effect of
privatization on wages is mainly driven by composition effects instead of productivity effects
(see also La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999).
Following La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999), we evaluate the contribution of layoffs
to the changes in profitability. We compute operating income for the post-privatization period for
each SOE maintaining the pre-privatization level of employment. Then, we estimate model (2)
for the operating income to sales ratio. The coefficient of the privatization dummy variable drops
to 0.67.
16 Thus, only 20 percent of the estimated increase in the median operating income to sales
ratio seems to be due to workers’ layoffs, a figure considerably lower than the one estimated by
La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) for Mexico.
17     
Regarding the impact of privatization on investment, all the measures analyzed are
positively and significantly affected by privatization. Investment itself increased at least 350
percent as a result of privatization. This effect is enormous and well above the one found in
Mexico by La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes. This result is consistent with the view that one of the
main motives to sell the SOEs in Argentina was to re-establish investment. 
Finally, we consider the behavior of prices. The main difficulty in identifying the impact
of privatization on prices is that prices were usually increased prior to privatization of firms –
substantially in some cases – in order to attract private investors. Moreover, prices were not
                                                     
15 At least sixty percent of the estimated (conditional) median impact of the privatizations on real wages may be
explained by the change in the average age of the workers if the data from YPF is representative of all privatizations.
We estimated an earnings function using wage data from the random sample of displaced workers from YPF for the
year 1991 and computed the implied decrease in average real wages as the result of the estimated change in the
average age of the workers of YPF after privatization.     
16 It is still statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level of significance. 
17 This statistic may overestimate the contribution of layoffs to profits because it assumes that the laid-off workers
were completely unproductive. raised just before every privatization but, rather, their increase tended to be associated with the
launch of the privatization package at the beginning of the 1990s. Thus, there is not enough
variability across both firms and time in the changes in prices as a result of privatization to
identify the effect of the latter on the former. Furthermore, we lack enough data in the immediate
pre-privatization period to document this effect. Additionally, the quality of several products
supplied by the privatized firms increased significantly after privatization. These changes in
quality are difficult to measure but widely acknowledged in several sectors such as
telecommunications and electricity.
18 
Under these restrictions, we do not find any statistically significant effect of privatization
on prices. Nevertheless, prices did not fall in the post-privatization period, when the efficiency
gains we documented entail that prices should have fallen if the improvements in quality were
not large enough. Thus, these results suggest that there is an important regulatory mission to be
undertaken in Argentina.
19
5.  Results: Banks
The Argentine banking sector went through an important transformation after the Tequila
financial crisis of 1995 following the devaluation of the Mexican peso in December of 1994.
Under the currency board, the monetary authority, the Central Bank (BCRA), faced severe limits
to acting as a lender of last resort. Thus, it could not bail out the banks that were facing solvency
problems. Instead, the BCRA helped these banks to be acquired, to merge or, in the case of
public banks, privatized. This process led to a significant reduction in the total number of banks
operating in the country from 168 in December 1994 to 122 two years later (Burdisso et al.,
1998).
The data set used in this study was compiled by the Central Bank and contains monthly
financial information for all the entities that comprised the Argentine financial system from the
                                                     
18 For example, our results on the effect of privatization on child mortality in Section 6 should come from a mix of
better access and improved water quality.
19 FIEL (1999) also finds that most of the real prices of the goods and services provided by the former SOEs did not
increase during the 1990s even though most of them were raised at the beginning of the decade. Nevertheless, the
prices of the goods and services of most privatized firms are indexed to the US CPI. Since 1995, this has implied
that the prices of the privatized firms could have increased 18.5 percent with respect to the domestic CPI. However,
these changes in prices are not identified as a result of the privatization even though they are caused by the
regulatory framework. Clearly, this regulatory pricing policy is inconsistent with a fixed exchange rate policy such
as the one adopted by Argentina during the 1990s.period June 1993 to September 1999. It includes the basic balance sheet accounts, the net income
structure, and some physical data such as information on employees and branches for each bank.
Although the data set covers the period when almost all privatizations took place, not all the
information is available for every bank variable at every moment. In particular, more
disaggregated data are available as we look at more recent periods.
These data have the advantage of being perfectly comparable across institutions, as well
as before and after the privatizations, since the Central Bank as regulator of the financial system
requires the entities to present their balance sheets using uniform accounts and criteria. In 1991,
there were 35 public banks in Argentina. They were owned mostly by the provinces (27 banks)
but also by national and municipal governments (8 banks). Between 1992 and 1999, 19 of these
public banks were privatized, 2 were merged and, hence, only 14 banks remained under public
ownership by September 1999. From the 19 privatized banks, we include 17 in our study, since
there were two banks in the data set for which no pre-privatization information was available.
These are the cases of Banco de La Rioja (privatized in July 1994) and Banco de Corrientes
(May 1993). The privatization of the Banco Hipotecario Nacional is not covered here either
because it was undertaken after September 1999. The variables used in the study are detailed in
Appendix 2.
When an SOE is privatized, the government usually tries to make the firm more attractive
to buyers and ultimately sells it – after a restructuring process – without the “undesirable” assets
and liabilities. In the case of the Argentine public banks, most of the provincial governments
formed a residual entity with the low quality assets and liabilities. To be able to face the short
term liabilities, the Argentine government, the Inter-American Development Bank and the World
Bank created the “Fondo Fiduciario para el Desarrollo Provincial” (FFDP) to lend money and
technically assist the provinces to privatize their banks. Thus, the privatization of provincial
banks involved the creation of residual entities with the purpose of keeping the low quality assets
and liabilities that would not be attractive to potential buyers. For this reason, stock variables
such as total assets and deposits are worthless for detecting changes in performance due to
ownership changes. Instead, we consider performance ratios. 
We are interested in analyzing the change in performance of our sample of banks
following privatization. We rely on five broad indicators of performance: (1) profitability, (2)
operating efficiency, (3) employment, (4) capitalization, and (5) loan growth. Appendix 2describes our variables. We express nominal variables in 1999 pesos deflating them by the
aggregate CPI index. 
Turning now to the results, it is worth noting first that most profitability indicators of
privatized banks increased dramatically in the post-privatization period. Table 8 shows simple
before and after comparisons for the mean and median profitability indicators. Looking at the
profitability ratios, almost every indicator is negative in the pre-privatization period and turns
positive after it. The median increase of the profit margin, operating margin, interest margin,
return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) are all statistically significant.
20 However,
the median operating income per branch decreased after privatization. 















Profit Margin (%) -27.07 22.32 1.09 -15.51 7.53 100.62 ***
Operating Margin (%) -37.56 -15.52 0.56 -22.67 5.96 109.99 ***
Interest Margin (%) -0.83 0.79 3.41 *** 0.20 0.55 101.71 ***
Operating Income
         per Branch 142 123 -0.61 145 107 11.47 ***
ROA (%) -0.007 0.002 4.93 *** -0.002 0.001 167.20 ***
ROE (%) -2.305 1.224 0.66 -1.141 1.149 98.91 ***
Notes:
(i)  *** Statistically different from zero at the 0.01 level of significance. ** Statistically different from zero
at the 0.05 level of significance.
(ii)  Number of observations: Profit Margin: 987; Operating Margin: 985, Interest Margin: 955; Operating
Income per Branch: 723; ROA: 1148 and ROE: 1148.
                                                     
20 The changes in the interest margins are mainly due to the reduction in the non-performing share of loans after
privatization. When we perform a test of mean differences on the interest margin without netting the non-performing
loans, we only reject the hypothesis of equal means at the 10 percent significance level. This improvement in the
loan performance after privatization could be the result of private banks implementing a better management of credit
decisions, or just because the “bad loans” were placed on the residual entity. In the latter case, again, the bank fixed
effect assumption in the before and after estimator breaks down. We now analyze the influence of the privatization of banks on the set of performance
indicators selected estimating the model described in equation (1). In contrast to the case of non-
financial firms, not all the public banks were privatized during the 1990s. Following our
definition of the parameter α in the previous section, we only include the public banks in the
control group. In Table 9, we present two different estimates of the impact of the privatization of
banks on their performance. In the first column, the data one year before and one year after the
privatizations are not included in the analysis while in the second column they are included. The
data just before privatization could be misleading since the government could be trying to
restructure the banks before privatization to increase their attractiveness or, in case of corruption,
could have modified the financial records to favor friends at the auctions (the cooked-book
hypothesis). The year after privatization could be considered as one dedicated to the restructuring
process (see La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999).
We report the difference in difference estimates of the impact of privatization on the set
of indicators proposed. Most results are similar across samples. The overall positive impact of
privatization on profitability is not confirmed. Even though we find a statistically significant
increase in ROA, which increases as a result of the privatization of public banks, we do not find
any statistically significant impact on ROE. The impact on the operating income per branch,
however, is negative and statistically significant. The interest margin also increased in
association with the privatization of banks. However, the evidence suggests that the privatization
impact on both the profit and operating margins is not statistically significant. 
Contrary to the case of non-financial firms, we do not find large increases in operating
efficiency after the privatization of public banks. The impact of privatization on the (conditional)
mean average costs is nil. In addition, the impact of privatization on the mean administrative
expenses is positive and statistically significant. They shoot up 36 percent as a result of
privatization. However, other indicators of efficiency performed better because of privatization.
Output per employee rises 20 percent while the average number of employees per branch has
falls 37 percent as a result of privatization. As in the case of the non-financial firms, employment
cuts are a big part of the story. Employment decreases approximately 36 percent due to
privatization. Thus, on several indicators, the privatized banks seem to be more efficient after the
privatization than before. This result is in line with the results found in Burdisso et al. (1998).Table 9. Changes in Performance for the Privatized Public Banks








ROA 2,007 0.01 ***





Profit Margin 1,724 1.22
(0.94) 1,923 1.24 *
(0.77)
Operating Margin 1,666 0.30
(1.08) 1,864 -0.06
(0.84)
Interest Margin 1,675 0.02 ***
(0.004) 1,874 0.03 ***
(0.01)
(Operating Income) /








    Expenses) 1,996 0.31 ***
(0.02) 2,226 0.44 ***
(0.02)
Log (Output/employee) 1,392 0.19 ***
(0.03) 1,581 0.14 ***
(0.03)
Log (Employees/Branch) 1,507 -0.46 ***
(0.02) 1,694 -0.55 ***
(0.02)
III. Employment
Log (Employees) 1,513 -0.45 ***







Loan growth (%) 1,922 0.03***
(0.01) 1,462 0.07***
(0.01)
*** Statistically different from zero at the 0.01 level of significance. ** Statistically different from zero at the
0.05 level of significance. * Statistically different from zero at the 0.1 level of significance.
The privatization process has also implied a supply increase in the credit market. Finally,
an important issue is the solvency of the privatized banks. The average capitalization ratio (Net
Worth/Assets) increased 5 percent because of privatization. This increase in capitalization isstatistically significant. It is important to note that the average capitalization of the banks in the
year before privatization was –10 percent; this helps to understand the rationale for privatization.
The higher capitalization rate of the privatized banks means a more solvent system, which is
quite important in countries as vulnerable to external shocks as Argentina. This is in line with the
consensus that the reforms taken by the BCRA after the Tequila crisis regarding the approval of
mergers, liquidation of bankruptcy banks, and privatizations helped to strengthen the financial
system.
6.  Privatization of Water and Sewerage Companies: Access to Services and
Welfare 
In this section, we study the impact of the privatization of water and sewerage companies on
both access to services and child mortality. There are three reasons for our selecting the
privatization of water and sanitation services as the focus of our analysis. 
First, access to water supply and sanitation is a fundamental need. The significance of
water, as distinct from other infrastructure industries, lies in the fact that human survival depends
on access to water that is free of unhealthy pollutants. The health and economic benefits of water
supply and sanitation supply to households and individuals (especially children) are well-
documented. The lack of a suitable domestic water supply leads to disease through two principal
transmission routes: waterborne disease transmission which occurs by drinking contaminated
water and water-washed disease which occurs when there is lack of water. Approximately 4
billion cases of diarrhea each year cause 2.2 million deaths throughout the world, mostly among
children under the age of five. These deaths represent approximately 15 percent of all child
deaths under the age of five in developing countries (cf. WHO, 2000). Diarrhea is the most
important public health problem affected by water and sanitation and can be both waterborne and
water-washed. Water, sanitation, and hygiene interventions reduce diarrheal disease by between
one-quarter and one-third on average (cf. Esrey et al., 1991). Thus, of all privatizations, the
transfers of the provision of water and sanitation services are the ones that could have the highest
impact on a direct measure of welfare such as health. 
Second, the proportion of people in the world with access to water and sanitation
facilities has remained constant over the period 1990-2000 in spite of all the efforts and
programs to increase the access of the poor to these services (cf. WHO, 2000). Thus, it is ofspecial interest to test whether the privatization of water and sanitation services caused an
increase in access. 
Third, water and sanitation is a natural monopoly in which declining long run average
costs make it the most efficient for only a single firm to serve the market. Moreover, water
differs from other natural monopolies in the importance of the externalities present. Both the
natural monopoly feature and the health effects of water and sanitation create a high level of
public interest in the sector (see Shirley, 2000).  
Between 1991 and 2000, several provincial privatizations in the water sector occurred, in
addition to the privatization of the federal SOE Obras Sanitarias de la Nación, which transferred
the responsibility for water and sanitation service in the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area to the
private company Aguas Argentinas in May 1993.
21 The provision of water has been privatized in
localities covering approximately 60 percent of the population of the country (as of the 1991
census). Water and sanitation privatizations are dispersed throughout the decade. Thus, there are
localities in Argentina where privatization has not yet taken place, while, in those where it
occurred, there is variability across both localities and time. This political experiment generates
an exogenous variation in the provision of water and sanitation services across time and space.
We exploit this instrument to identify the causal effect of water and sanitation privatization on
both access to water and child mortality. 
Table 10 shows the access to both water and sanitation services in urban areas in 1991.
The level of connections to the water network is high (approximately 70 percent of the
population) but certainly far from achieving full coverage as in the capital. The incidence of
connection to sewerage networks is much lower (approximately 37 percent of the population).
Apart from that, the privatized and not privatized localities during the whole decade do not show
substantial differences in the proportion of the population (households) with access to the water
network.
                                                     
21 The first potable water service of Argentina was provided by Obras Sanitarias de la Nación (OSN) in 1870.
Initially it served 30,000 people and coverage continued to expand until 1960. That expansion ended in the 1970s. In
the 1980s, coverage as a share of population actually contracted. The jurisdiction of OSN was nationwide until
1980. At that point, it was restricted to the federal capital and 13 localities of greater Buenos Aires. Responsibility
for service in the rest of the country was transferred to provincial governments (see Artana et al., 1999).Table 10. Access to Water Services, 1991

























Total 70 73 37 41
Localities privatized between 1990 and 1999 71 74 40 45
Localities not privatized between 1990 and 1999 69 70 29 32
Localities privatized between 1990 and 1997 77 80 44 49
Localities not privatized between 1990 and 1997 64 66 30 33
Federal Capital (privatized between 1990 and 1997) 98 98 94 94
Notes:
1.  The data are obtained from the 1991 census of households and population. 
2.  Urban population: All localities with more than 5,000 habitants in 1991.
3.  A locality is in the privatized group if the privatization of water services occurred between 1990 and
1997 (1999). Obviously, all the localities in the group privatized between 1990 and 1997 are in the
group privatized between 1990 and 1999.
 
Artana et al. (1999) analyze the first two privatizations of water and sewage services in
Argentina: Aguas Argentinas (formerly OSN) and Aguas de Corrientes. For Corrientes, they
report significant increases in access using official data for the period 1991 to 1995. The number
of connections in the area covered by Aguas de Corrientes rose by 22 percent and the number of
sewerage connections by 50 percent during this short period, which translates into an additional
7 percentage points of the population covered by water services and 12 percentage points of the
population covered by sewerage services. These increases in coverage are extraordinary by any
standard. For Aguas Argentinas, we obtained similar data from the regulator for the period 1980
to 1999 and we estimated the following regression function (where the notation is self-
explanatory, and t equals 1, 2, 3,…,20): 
Log (Population served) = const. +  0.0064  t   +   0.042 (t – 14) I{t>14}
         (0.001) ***    (0.006) ***
R
2 = 0.94Figure 2. Logarithm of Population Connected to the Water Network
and Fitted Values
Aguas Argentinas, 1980-1999
The increase in the access to water services in the area covered by Aguas Argentinas after
privatization also seems to be exceptional. During this period, the population covered by access
to water services increased by approximately 3 percent per year.
22  
These figures, however, are not estimates of the causal effect of privatization of water on
access to service. First, there is a measurement error problem since although the firms know
exactly how the connections have expanded, this translates noisily into figures for population
served. We only have household data on access to service from the 1991 census, and from a
random survey conducted in 1997 (Encuesta de Desarrollo Social (EDS)), which covered all
urban localities with more than 5,000 habitants and in which the questions about access to water
connections were identical to the census questions. Second, and more importantly, connections
could have also expanded without privatization. Thus, to identify the causal effect of
privatization on access to water, we exploit the fact that between 1991 and 1997, the two dates
for which we possess household access information, some privatizations affecting several
                                                     
22 According to our estimates, the population served increased 4.8 percent per year while population itself increased
approximately 1.7 percent per year. 
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15.9localities had already occurred. Thus, for the localities that were randomly chosen in the EDS
survey, we perform a test of the difference in difference of the proportion of households with
access to the water network in 1991 and 1997 between urban localities where water provision
had been privatized and those where it had not. The results are reported in Table 11.
Table 11. Proportion of Households with Access to Water Connection, 1991-1997
Water
(%)
All localities Excluding Federal Capital
Localities not privatized: 1991
Census data
86.6 86.6



















for difference in the changes in
proportions
2.83 *** 5.78 ***
 Notes:
1.  Only the localities randomly chosen in the EDS survey are included in the 1991 estimates. Sampling
weights are used to estimate the proportions reported in the table.  
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= , where p is the proportion of
households with access to water connection in year t in a locality where water has been privatized
between 1991 and 1997 (Lpriv) or in a locality where water has not been privatized between 1991 and
1997 (Lnpriv), and n is the number of observations. Note that there is not sample variability when we
estimate p for 1991 since these statistics are estimated from census data. 
3.  *** Statistically different from zero at the 0.01 level of significance. ** Statistically different from
zero at the 0.05 level of significance. * Statistically different from zero at the 0.1 level of significance.
4.  A locality is in the privatized group if the privatization of water services occurred between 1990 and
1997. Thus, we find a statistically significant increase in the access to water services caused by
the privatization of firms. Similar results are found in terms of population. Note that the increase
is more pronounced when we exclude the federal capital where access was already complete
before the privatization. Also, note that the increase in the access to water services in the
privatized regions is approximately 11 percent (from 64.0 percent to 71.4 percent, excluding
Buenos Aires). This increase is consistent with the increase in access to water services that we
estimated for OSN for the period 1993-1997. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the estimates
of the increase in access to water services induced by privatization between 1991 and 1997
underestimate the causal impact of the privatizations of water services on access because the
network expansion induced by privatization is phased over a longer period than the one covered
by the test we conduct. 
Finally, we evaluate the impact of the privatization of water services on child mortality.
Mortality data are compiled in Argentina by the Ministerio de Salud. The data are constructed at
the locality level, disaggregated by age. Although the data are not publicly available, we have
been able to access the data for the 66 localities in the country with 100,000 or more inhabitants.
These account for 58.6 percent of the total population and 64.4 percent of the urban population.
We focus here on child mortality (mortality of children below 5 years of age) since children are
more vulnerable to water-related diseases such as, for example, diarrhea (WHO, 2000). We
divide the number of deaths by the number of children of that age to obtain Mortality Rates, the
dependent variable of the following analysis. 
Consider the evaluation of the impact of the privatization of water provision on child
mortality.
23 The difference in difference estimator of the impact of privatization on mortality, α,
is obtained by estimating the following regression function:  
it i t it it ε µ λ dPriv α Rates Mortality + + + + = it x β (3)
where Mortality Ratesit are the mortality rates of children below 5 years of age in locality i and
year t, xit is a set of control variables (income and inequality)
24 that vary both across localities
and time, and dPrivit is a zero-one indicator that equals unity if in locality i and period t the main
                                                     
23 It is also worth noting that most privatizations also included the provision of sanitation services. provider of water services is a private firm. When dPrivit is zero, the main provider of water
services in locality i and period t may be a public firm or a cooperative. Finally, µi is a time-
invariant effect unique to locality i, λt is a time effect common to all localities in period t, and εit
is a locality time-varying error distributed independently across locality and time, and
independently of all µi and λt.
In Table 12, we report the results of this exercise. We find a negative and statistically
significant effect on child mortality of the privatization of water services. The estimated
coefficient implies a decrease of approximately 5 percent in child mortality rates induced by the
privatization of water services. Thus, we find that the privatization of water services induced
both an increase in the access to water services and a reduction in child mortality. 
Table 12. The Effect of Privatization on Child Mortality Rates
1990-1999
Dependent Variable: Mortality Rates
DPrivit - 0.21*
(0.12)
Number of observations 658
Number of localities 66
Notes: 
1.  All regressions include year and province fixed effects.  
*** Statistically different from zero at the 0.01 level of significance. 
** Statistically different from zero at the 0.05 level of significance. 
* Statistically different from zero at the 0.1 level of significance. 
7.  Privatization and Worker Displacement: Wages and Welfare Distribution 
A great deal of attention has been devoted in recent years to the consequences of worker
displacement for individual labor market performance (see, among others, Hamermesh, 1989 and
Hall, 1995). Worker displacement is generally defined as the separation of workers “without
cause” that does not involve recall. This type of involuntary rupture in employment relationships
is usually associated with the consequences of structural change, sectoral reallocation or
technological innovation. Displacement is usually followed by a period of slow rebuilding of
                                                                                                                                                                          
24 Household Income and Inequality (the ratio of top 10 percentile to bottom 10 percentile of the distribution of peremployment relationships, as workers displaced from long-term jobs require time to find a new
acceptable match (see Hall, 1995). Therefore, the emphasis of work on displacement is on long-
term losses after displacement. The workers displaced because of the privatization of SOEs
constitute an alternative valuable source for studying the consequences of worker displacement
for individual labor market performance.
One good reason to study worker displacement is that its consequences can yield insights
into the wage determination process. Human capital theory predicts that, to the extent that
experience and skills acquired on the job are general, displaced workers should not suffer large
wage losses upon reemployment. In contrast, workers with accumulated industry or firm-specific
capital or workers extracting industry or firm-specific rents are likely to sustain large pay cuts
when changing firms or sectors.
25 Thus, even if the privatization of SOEs induces a socially
efficient reduction in the level of employment in the privatized firms, this may badly harm the
laid-off workers. Hence, part of the efficiency gains of privatized firms may have come from the
breach of implicit and explicit contracts between workers and firms. In this section, we explore
to what extent workers displaced from privatization suffer long-term earning losses, relying on a
survey conducted of a random sample of displaced workers from the former state oil company
YPF. 
One of the salient characteristics of the Argentine privatization program is the huge
reduction in employment associated with it. Employment decreased approximately 40 percent as
a result of privatization. A very important question in itself but, also, as part of a broad study of
the microeconomic benefits and costs of privatization is the following: what has been the effect
of the privatizations on laid-off workers’ earnings? In order to address this question, we rely on a
survey of a random sample of workers that were displaced from YPF in 1991 as part of the
restructuring process of the firm before its privatization. The sample of the survey was a list of
all displaced workers from YPF during 1991, which yielded 504 observations. The survey was
conducted in the first week of August of 2001. In 1991, the surveyed individuals resided in
Buenos Aires, La Plata, Mendoza, Cutral Co, General Mosconi or Comodoro Rivadavia. 
In terms of measurement challenges, it is worth noting that because SOEs’ workers may
have been extracting rents, their wages did not reflect their productivity. Therefore, strictly, a
                                                                                                                                                                          
capita family income) data are obtained from the Permanent Household Survey (INDEC).long-term earnings loss because of privatization estimates a dimension of the distributive cost of
privatization, and not necessarily a destruction of worker-specific human capital. Thus, our
concern lies in the distribution of the costs of what otherwise appears to be an efficient reform.
Nonetheless, the impact of privatization on long-term earnings is not a minor point in society’s
perception of the costs and benefits of privatization. 
Certainly, the welfare of workers not only depends on their earnings but also, among
other things, on their fringe benefits, health insurance and the stability of their jobs. Thus, it is
informative to consider the overall subjective impact of privatization-driven displacement on the
laid-off workers’ welfare. We find that approximately 60 percent of the displaced workers in our
sample consider that they were worst affected because of displacement.
26,27,28 Nevertheless, even
if revealing, this is only a subjective appraisal of the overall costs of displacement.  
In addition to the earnings losses, laid-off workers in the United States experience more
unemployment than non-displaced workers (see, e.g., Ruhm, 1991). In our sample, even in the
long-term, we also find that this is the case. 
First, we need to consider the age distribution of the displaced workers in our sample.
Since displacement because of privatization was concentrated among workers older than 40, 30
percent of the surveyed individuals are older than 59 years at the present time. Indeed, 60 percent
of the sampled individuals are between 39 and 59 years and none of the displaced workers is
younger than 28 years now. 
In what follows, to draw inferences about this sample of displaced workers, we construct
comparison groups from the ongoing household survey.  The household survey is conducted
twice per year – in May and October – in the main 28 urban agglomerates of the country. 
The male labor force participation rate among the individuals younger than 60 displaced
from YPF is 90 percent.
29 Ideally, we would compare the statistics obtained from the survey of
                                                                                                                                                                          
25 By rent, we refer to the difference between what an employed worker can get from his employment relationship
and his outside option.  
26 Individuals were asked to consider the overall impact of displacement from YPF on their welfare, taking into
account that they received a severance payment at the time of displacement.  
27 Approximately 80 percent of the sample reported that the major loss among the benefits they lost because of
displacement was the health insurance package. 
28 Of those individuals currently employed, 50 percent consider that they are in a permanent (stable) job while 37 of
them consider that their current occupation is only a temporary job. The remaining 13 percent of the workers is not
sure about how to classify their current occupation with respect to its stability.  
29 The female labor force participation rate is 70 percent although there are only 33 females younger than 60 years in
the sample. the displaced workers from YPF with the same statistics estimated from the May 2001 wave of
the household survey in all urban agglomerates.
30  Unfortunately, at the time of writing, only the
data tapes of Greater Buenos Aires are available for May 2001. It is preferable to contrast
estimates of 2001 with statistics obtained using data from the same year since the recession
deepened during that year. Thus, we compare the statistics obtained from the sample of displaced
workers with the same statistics estimated using the data of greater Buenos Aires for May
2001.
31 The labor force participation rate among males between 28 and 59 years in greater
Buenos Aires is 96.3 percent. The participation rate in this control group and in the displaced
workers’ sample differs at the 1 percent level of significance. Similarly, we find that the
unemployment rate among males displaced from YPF is 26.4 percent while this statistic in the
control group is 13.9 percent.
32 Thus, we find that even though the labor force participation rate
of the displaced workers, 10 years after displacement, is slightly below the labor force
participation rate of a comparable group in the population, their unemployment rate is twice as
high as the population unemployment rate.
33  
7.1. The Long-Term Impact of Job Displacement on Earnings
While the bulk of the evidence on worker displacement comes from the United States, there is no
evidence at all from Latin America. Even as different methods and data sets have been used to
study the problem of worker displacement, the evidence from the United States is unambiguous:
in addition to the direct income loss associated with unemployment, workers face large and
persistent earnings losses after displacement (see, e.g., Jacobson et al., 1993). 
                                                     
30 Alternatively, we compare the statistics obtained from the survey of the displaced workers from YPF with the
same statistics estimated from the May 2001 wave of the household survey using data from the urban agglomerates
of Chubut, Greater Buenos Aires, La Plata, Mendoza, Neuquen and Salta. These regions geographically match the
places where our sample of displaced workers resides. 
31 The data gathered at the beginning of May 2001 and at the beginning of August 2001 are perfectly comparable. It
was only since October 2001 that the level of economic activity imploded in Argentina.  
32 The comparison with a control group formed using data from the urban agglomerates of Chubut, Greater Buenos
Aires, La Plata, Mendoza, Neuquen and Salta from the October 2000 wave of the household survey are identical: the
male participation rate is 94 percent while the male unemployment rate is 10.5 percent. 
33 These differences become more accentuated for skilled workers (at least some college or tertiary degree). The
male unskilled (at most high school) unemployment rate among workers displaced from YPF is 28 percent while the
male skilled unemployment rate in the same sample is 20 percent. The same statistics in the control group are,
respectively, 15.8 and 6.4 percent. Most of the research on the impact of job displacement on earnings assumes that
workers’ earnings at a given date depend on the time since displacement through a set of dummy
variables for the number of quarters after (and possibly before) displacement (see, e.g., Jacobson
et al., 1993). 
Consider the simplest case in which we observe earnings at time t0 before displacement
and earnings at time th. At time tj, where h > j > 0, a group of workers were displaced from their
jobs. If a longitudinal data set were available, we would estimate the displaced workers’ earnings
losses as the difference between their actual and expected earnings had the events that led to their
job losses not occurred. Thus, we would estimate a two-way fixed effect error component model
such as the following: 
it i t it it it ε µ λ x dDP α y + + + + = t β         (4)
where t = 0 or h; yit is the logarithm of earnings of worker i in period t, xit is a set of control
variables (standard human capital variables included in a earnings equation) that vary both across
localities and time, and dDPit is a zero-one indicator that equals unity in period h if individual i
in period j was displaced from his or her job. Finally, µi is a time-invariant effect unique to
individual i, λt is a time effect common to all individuals in period t, and εit is an individual time-
varying error distributed independently across individuals and time, and independently of all µi
and λt. It is worth noting that, in general, β is not allowed to be a time-varying parameter.
Indeed, by default, the regression function (4) models the “returns to education” as time-
invariant. This assumption is not free of problems since it assumes that the growth rate of
earnings is not affected by the change in relative prices. 
The control group would be the workers not displaced. Thus, it is critical that
displacement represents an event exogenous to the wage profile of the displaced individuals and
hence, the expected wages of the control group are the expected wages of the displaced workers
had they kept their jobs. In the case of privatization, while in principle displacement seems to be
an event exogenous to workers’ decisions, in practice, it is not. Displaced workers are older than
retained workers and displacement is dominated by selection based on individual characteristics.
However, the main problem with this counterfactual group is that the wages of the retained
workers are not the expected wages of the displaced workers had privatization not taken placesince privatization affects the whole functioning of the firm including productivity and real
wages. Furthermore, since our parameter of interest measures long-term earning losses due to
displacement caused by privatization, the control group would be formed by individuals that
have not been displaced since privatization and, hence, it constitutes an unusual group of workers
that is not likely to be comparable to the group of workers displaced because of privatization.   
In this study, conversely, we focus on a family of alternative parameters. We consider
that they are the parameters of interest in a study of the costs and benefits of privatization. First,
we define displaced workers’ earnings losses (DWEL) to be the difference between the actual
and expected earnings of a displaced worker where the expected earnings of a displaced worker
from a privatized firm is the expected earnings taken over the population of similar individuals in
terms of observable socioeconomic variables instead of the workers not displaced from a
privatized firm (DWEL I). We argue that, in general, this parameter is the appropriate evaluation
of the costs of displacement because of privatization in terms of earnings. However, Argentina
has a relatively generous system of severance payment (see Galiani and Nickell, 1999). Thus,
when displaced, workers received a non-negligible severance payment which they could invest
and obtain a flow of income. Naturally, workers may invest it differently, meeting with varying
degrees of success depending in part on their entrepreneurship abilities. Nonetheless, they could
invest it in secure coupon bond with a fixed interest rate and constant, regular repayment of
interest (e.g. US Treasury bonds). Thus, an alternative estimate of the displaced workers’
earnings losses is the difference between their actual and expected earnings where their actual
earnings also incorporate the potential flow of interests on a coupon bond over the severance
payment received at the time of displacement and where the expected earnings are defined in the
same way as before (DWEL II). 
In order to estimate our parameters of interest, consider the data-generating process of the
earnings of a typical displaced worker. In period 0, they are given by:  
i0 i i0 0 0 i0 ε µ x c y + + + = β      (5)
while in period h they are given by: 
ih i ih h h ih ε µ x c y + + + + = α β    (6)Thus, if we knew the parameter vector {ct,βt}t = 0,h, a consistent estimate of α would be
given by the following before and after estimator:  , ˆ it ω α ∆ = where . x β c y ω it t t it it − − =  Thus,
. ˆ it it ε α ω α ∆ + = ∆ = However, we do not know {ct,βt}t = 0,h. To circumvent the lack of
information we face, we estimate an earning equation in a sample representative of the
population in periods 0 and h. We therefore estimate the parameter vector {ct,βt}t = 0,h using a
control group. It is bears pointing out that our estimator of α is the simplest version of the
conditional difference in difference matching estimator (see Heckman et al., 1997). 
In our sample, t = 1991 and 2001. We estimate the parameter vector {ct,βt}t = 1991,2001 by
estimating earnings equations using household survey data from the greater Buenos Aires
agglomerate for the surveys of October 1991 and May 2001. We only sample males between 18
and 59 that had an occupation at the time these household surveys were conducted. The
dependent variable is the logarithm of the monthly earnings of the workers in their main
occupations. We exclude unpaid workers from the sample. The conditioning variables are a set
of schooling dummies and the age and the age squared of the sampled individuals. The schooling
dummy variables measure the maximum level of the educational system attended by an
individual and whether or not it has been completed. The base category in the regression function
is complete primary schooling. 
Since the household survey only captures earnings in the month previous to the survey,
we only consider the earnings of the displaced workers that were employed at the time they were
surveyed in 2001. To estimate DWEL II, we assume a monthly interest rate of half a percent
over the severance payment. In Table 13 we present our best estimates of DWEL I and DWEL
II. 
The results are unambiguous: displaced workers face long-term substantial earnings
losses. Our estimate of our statistic DWEL I is 51.8 percent of the earnings before
privatization.
34 This estimate is substantially higher than the one obtained by applying the before
and after estimator to the displaced workers’ data set: 39.4 percent. However, there are two
reasons why this latter measure does not capture the full effect of displacement on workers’
earnings. First, this measure does not control for macroeconomic factors that cause changes in
                                                     
34 Remember that the percentage change of y with respect to privatization is given by 100 [Exponential(α) – 1]. workers’ earnings regardless of whether they are displaced.
35 Second, this measure does not
account for the earnings growth that would have occurred in the absence of job loss; in the long-
term, workers’ earnings may return to their pre-displacement levels, but not to the levels
expected prior to their job losses (see Jacobson et al., 1993). 
As expected, our statistic DWEL II is somewhat lower than DWEL I at 41.7 percent.
Still, we estimate a quite substantial earnings loss after displacement, well above the earnings
losses because of displacement estimated in the United States. Thus, it appears that there is a
huge redistributive cost associated with the privatizations of SOEs: displaced workers incur
substantial earnings losses. What is more, since unemployment is higher among displaced
workers than among a comparison group in the population, the earning losses because of
displacement are higher than the one estimated by our statistic DWEL II. Indeed, we estimate
that after taking into account unemployment, the earnings losses caused by privatization are
approximately 50 percent of the real earnings of the workers before privatization.  










Number of displaced workers’ observations:
150
Number of displaced workers’ observations:
139
 Notes: 
1.  Standard errors are computed by assuming that our estimate of {ct,βt}t = 1991,2001 coincides with the
true parameter values. However, bootstrap standard errors are less than 10 percent off from the
ones reported. Thus, none of the results would change if instead, bootstrap standard errors were
reported. 
2.  *** Statistically different from zero at the 0.01 level of significance. ** Statistically different from
zero at the 0.05 level of significance. * Statistically different from zero at the 0.1 level of
significance. 
3.  The estimate of DWEL II does not change at all if we do not impute the potential monthly flow of
interests because of investing the severance payment in a secure coupon bond to a few
observations that report they actually obtain monetary profits from the investment they did with
the severance payment they received after displacement. 
                                                     
35 In our case, even inflation is not captured by our before and after estimate although it is straightforward to capture
this effect by the slightly modified before and after estimator. Finally, it is worth asking from where the earning losses of displaced workers come.
Figure 3 shows the correlation of our estimates of ω1991 and ω2001. Notice that ωt measures the
rent of a worker (i.e., the difference between what an employed worker gets from his
employment relationship and his outside option). As can be observed, almost all workers
extracted (positive) rents in 1991 while only half of them where still obtaining (positive) rents in
2001.
Figure 3. Displaced Workers Earnings Rents: 1991 and 2001
(The 2001 earnings do not include interest)
8.  Conclusions
In this paper, we evaluated both the efficiency and some significant distributional impacts of the
Argentine privatization program. This was done by considering privatization as a policy
instrument and by exploiting the fact that exposure to privatization of a group of economic units
(i.e., SOEs, public banks, households and workers) varied both by unit and by year. Thus, we
exploited a similar statistical identification strategy to document some of the costs and benefits
of privatization. Although we were not able to identify all the efficiency and distributional











2the literature by documenting a wide set of causal effects of privatization on measures of
efficiency and distribution.
Following La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999), we studied the effects of privatization
on profitability, operating efficiency, productivity, output, investment, employment, wages and
prices for both the financial and non-financial privatized firms in Argentina during the 1990s.
We also studied two direct measures of the welfare impact of privatizations. First, the Argentine
program involved the privatization of local water and sewerage firms. Changes in population
health associated with these privatizations would provide a measure of the impact of
privatization that goes beyond transfers of consumer surplus. We evaluated how the privatization
of local water and sewerage firms affected both access to service and child mortality. Second, the
Argentine program involved massive layoffs. Profitability gains in privatized firms may have
been obtained at the expense of workers. We measured the effect of privatizations on workers’
earnings by comparing the before and after wages of a random sample of laid-off workers from
the former state oil company (YPF) with a matched counterfactual group build up using micro
data gathered from the ongoing household survey. 
We find that the profitability of the non-financial firms increased after privatization. Both
operating income to sales and net income to sales increased significantly as a result of
privatization. Large increases in operating efficiency underpin these gains in profitability. The
impact of privatization on the (conditional) median unit costs shows a reduction of the latter of
10 percent. The median sales to employment ratio also increases 10 percent because of the
privatization of the SOEs. Finally, the impact of privatization on the median level of productivity
shows an increase of the latter of 46 percent. Thus, overall we find a huge increase in the
operating efficiency of the privatized firms in Argentina. However, employment cuts are a big
part of the story. Employment decreased approximately 40 percent as a result of privatization.
Labor productivity not only increased because employment decreased, but also because
privatized firms increased production. The median level of production increased 25 percent
because of privatization. Regarding the impact of privatization on investment, all the measures
analyzed are positively and significantly affected by privatization. Investment itself increased at
least 350 percent as a result of privatization. This result is consistent with the view that one of
the main motives to sell the SOEs in Argentina was to re-establish investment. Finally, we do not
find any statistically significant effect of privatization of prices. Nevertheless, in the post-privatization period, prices did not decrease, when the efficiency gains we documented entail
that they should have fallen if the quality improvements were not large enough. Thus, there is an
important regulatory mission to be accomplished in Argentina. 
Contrary to the case of non-financial firms, we do not find large increases in operating
efficiency after the privatization of public banks. The impact of privatization on the (conditional)
mean average costs is nil. In addition, impact of privatization on the mean administrative
expenses is positive and statistically significant. They have increased 36 percent as a result of
privatization. However, other indicators of efficiency performed better because of privatization.
Output per employee increased 20 percent while the average number of employees per branch
has decreased 37 percent as a result of privatization. As in the case of the non-financial firms,
employment cuts play a leading role. Employment decreased approximately 36 percent because
of privatization. Thus, on several indicators, the privatized banks seem to be more efficient after
the privatization than before. The privatization of public banks has also implied an increase in
credit supply (loans grew by about 3 percent). Finally, the average capitalization  ratio (Net
Worth/Assets) increased 5 percent because of privatization. The higher capitalization rate of the
privatized banks means a more solvent system, which is quite important in countries as
vulnerable to external shocks as Argentina. 
On the direct measures of welfare analyzed, we find a negative and statistically
significant effect on child mortality of the privatization of water services. The estimated
coefficient implies a decrease of approximately 5 percent in child mortality rates induced by the
privatization of water provision. Turning to our estimate of the displaced workers earning losses,
it appears that there is a huge redistributive cost associated with the privatizations of SOEs:
displaced workers incur substantial earnings losses. The earning losses because of displacement,
after taking into account unemployment, are approximately 50 percent of the real earnings of the
workers before privatization.  
Overall, our results paint a favorable picture of privatization. We have identified
extraordinary increases in the efficiency of the privatized firms. We have also identified that
privatization has succeeded in satisfying other important objectives such us restoring investment
and enhancing the solvency of the financial system. Finally, we considered some direct impacts
of privatization on welfare and found mixed results. Thus, although we found important benefits
of privatization, we also found direct costs associated with them. However, a caveat is in orderhere. It should be taken into account that we perform a partial equilibrium analysis. This paper
analyzes the effects of privatization on several measures of firm performance, and on consumers’
and employees’ welfare in the markets affected by the privatizations. We do not evaluate
potential macroeconomic effects of a massive privatization program such as the one
implemented in Argentina.References
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Gas: Gas del Estado, a vertically integrated monopoly, was privatized in December 1992 and
vertically divided into several production companies, two transport companies and eight
distribution companies. The transport and distribution companies operate as local monopolies.
ENARGAS (Ente Nacional Regulador del Gas) is the national regulatory authority. Competition
is only allowed in the market for large users, who can buy gas directly from producers. 
Financial statements of Gas del Estado were obtained from ENARGAS, financial statements for
the private companies were obtained from the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange (if the firms are
publicly traded) and from Inspección General de Justicia.
Telecommunications: ENTEL (Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones), which was
transferred to private hands in November 1990, was divided into two new companies, Telecom
and Telefónica de Argentina, to provide telecommunications services in the northern part and
southern part of the country respectively. The companies operated as regional monopolies until
1999, when entry in the long distance market was deregulated. Entry in local markets was
deregulated in 2000. The regulatory authority is the CNC (Comisión Nacional de
Comunicaciones).
The sources of information were the financial statements of ENTEL obtained from SIGEN, the
financial statements of Telecom and Telefónica de Argentina, Heymann and Kosacoff (2000),
and statistical information from the International Telecommunications Union 1991 and 2001. No
official financial statements were produced for Entel for the years 1989 and 1990. The price
structure changed several times during the decade making price comparisons difficult. We use
the telecommunications index of the CPI as our price variable.
Electricity: In the electricity sector, the largest SOEs were SEGBA (Servicios Eléctricos del
Gran Buenos Aires), Agua y Energía Eléctrica, and Hidronor (Hidroeléctrica Norpatagónica).
SEGBA was the distributor in Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area, but it also generated part of the
energy it distributed. Agua y Energía Eléctrica and Hidronor were basically generators of
electricity. With the privatization, the electrical sector was vertically divided into generation,
transport and distribution. SEGBA was divided into three distributors (Edenor, Edesur and
Edelap) and five generators (Central Puerto, Central Costanera, Central Dock Sud, Central
Dique, and Central Pedro de Mendoza). Hidronor and Agua y Energía Eléctrica were divided
into 6 transport companies, and 22 generators. Competition occurs, mainly, in the generation
activities. The sector is now subject to regulation by the Secretary of Energy, ENRE (Ente
Nacional Regulador de la Electricidad), and CAMMESA (Compañía Administradora del
Mercado Mayorista Eléctrico SA). The Secretary of Energy is responsible for the norms in the
sector, ENRE is responsible for the application of these norms, and CAMMESA is responsible
for the coordination among the different participants in the market (generators, transporters and
distributors).
We obtained SEGBA financial statements for the period 1986-1991 from SIGEN and Ministerio
de Economía, and financial statements of Edenor, Edesur, Edelap, Central Puerto and CentralCostanera (the firms that resulted from the SEGBA divestiture) for the period 1992-94 from
ENRE. With respect to Hidronor, we obtained two audit statements for 1987 and 1988, and the
final financial statement for 1991. We also obtained data for 99.92% of the generators companies
that emerged from the privatization of Hidronor. In relation to the six transport companies, we
were able to find information for three of them that account for 91.7% of the privatization
income of the electricity transportation companies. Our sources of information were: Ministerio
de Economía, SIGEN, ENRE, Buenos Aires Stock Exchange, and the companies that were
willing to collaborate.
Water and Sewage: Obras Sanitarias de la Nación was the provider of water and sewage
services in the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area and was transferred to private hands in 1992.
Aguas Argentinas is the private company that provides these services under a 35-year
concession. The Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area regulatory authority is ETOSS (Ente Tripartito
de Obras y Servicios Sanitarios). In other parts of the country the water and sewage services are
provided by a large and heterogeneous group of companies (cooperatives, municipal and
provincial companies), several of which were also privatized.
We focus on Obras Sanitarias de la Nación and Aguas Argentinas. The data for these companies
were obtained from official financial statements from Ministerio de Economía and SIGEN. Most
of the local providers that are or were (before privatization) cooperatives or local companies do
not have financial statements.
Airlines: Aerolíneas Argentinas was privatized in 1990. It operates as an unregulated oligopoly
in the domestic market and competes in the international market. Information on Aerolíneas
Argentinas was obtained from Ministerio de Economía (before privatization) and the official
financial statements of the company (after privatization).
Railroads: Ferrocarriles Argentinos was the SOE that managed the entire country’s railroad
system. In a first stage towards privatization, the company was divided into three segments:
cargo, urban passengers, and long distance passengers. The cargo segment was finally divided
into five private companies, which obtained 30-year concessions for the payment of an annual
canon and a preset investment schedule. These companies are BAP (Buenos Aires al Pacífico
San Martín SA), NCA (Nuevo Central Argentino SA), Ferrocarril Mesopotámico, Ferrosur Roca,
and Ferroexpreso Pampeano.
In the urban passenger sector, a new company, FEMESA (Ferrocarriles Metropolitanos SA), was
created in April 1991, and then divided into seven lines according to the old Ferrocarriles
Argentinos lines. One company, Trenes de Buenos Aires SA, operates two lines (Mitre and
Sarmiento). Thus, in this segment there are six companies operating seven railway lines. The
private companies have an investment schedule and they receive an annual subsidy, since it was
generally believed that the companies would not make positive profits.
In the long distance passenger segment, it was believed that the private sector was not going to
be interested since the sector was unprofitable. The operation was offered by the federal
government to the provinces interested in maintaining the service. Only seven provincesaccepted this offer, and the rest of the services were discontinued. The regulatory authority is the
CNRT (Comisión Nacional Reguladora del Transporte).
The data for the railways companies were obtained from SIGEN (before privatization) and from
the official financial statements of the companies and Ministerio de Economía (after
privatization).
Postal Services: The SOE was ENCOTEL (Empresa Nacional de Correos y Telégrafos), which
was transformed into ENCOTESA (Empresa Nacional de Correos y Telégrafos SA) in December
1992. ENCOTESA was privatized in September 1997. Since December 1997 it has been
controlled and operated by private hands as Correo Argentino SA. This private group has a 30-
year concession for the payment of an annual canon. The regulatory authority is the CNC.
The data for postal services were obtained from SIGEN (before privatization) and from the
official financial statements of the company (after privatization).
Oil: YPF (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales) was the SOE sold to the private sector in 1992.
However, many of YPF’s assets, such as tankers, fleet, two refineries, and most of the primary
and secondary drilling areas, were sold separately. The company has operated in a non-regulated
market since 1991. Repsol of Spain later acquired it.
What remained as YPF in private hands is not the same as the former public SOE.  Most of the
assets that were sold separately now belong to preexisting firms, which makes the comparison
with the performance in public hands impossible. Taking this into account, we compare YPF to
what remained of YPF in private hands. The data for both the public and private YPF were
obtained from official financial statements from Ministerio de Economía and the firm’s website.
SOMISA and Tandanor: These two companies were under the control of Ministerio de
Defensa. SOMISA (Sociedad Mixta Siderurgica Argentina) was the main steel manufacturer in
Argentina. Between 1991 and 1995 there was a “transition company”, Aceros Paraná, which was
later privatized as SIDERAR in 1995. Tandanor (Talleres Navales Darsena Norte), a shipyard,
was transferred to private ownership in December 1991. Both SOMISA and Tandanor operate in
non-regulated markets.
The data found for SOMISA are incomplete, since the only source of information is an audit
report. There are no data available for Aceros Paraná (transition company for SOMISA). The
data for Tandanor were obtained from SIGEN (before privatization) and from Inspección
General de Justicia (after privatization).
Banks: Even though the major economic reforms in Argentina took place during the first half of
the decade, the banking sector underwent an important transformation after the Tequila crisis of
December 1994. The process led to a reduction in the number of banks from 168 in December
1994 to 122 two years later (Burdisso et. al., 1998). In 1991, there were 35 public banks, mostly
owned by the provinces (27 banks) but also by national (4 banks) or municipal governments (4
banks). From the 35 public banks that started the decade, 19 were privatized between 1992 and
1999, 2 were merged with privatized banks and 14 banks remain owned by the public sector. Weanalyze the privatization of 17 banks. We dropped two banks for which there was no pre-
privatization information available (Banco de La Rioja, privatized in July 1994; and Banco de
Corrientes, privatized in May 1993). We do not include the privatization of the Banco
Hipotecario Nacional because it was done after the period covered by our database. They operate
in a competitive market under supervision by the Central Bank.
The data set utilized is provided by the Central Bank (BCRA) and contains monthly financial
information of all the entities that operated in the Argentine Financial System for the period June
1993 through September 1999. It includes the basic balance sheet accounts, income structure and
some physical data (employees, branches, etc.). Although the data set covers the period in which
almost all the bank privatizations took place, not all the information is available for every point
in time. More disaggregated and better quality data are available for more recent periods.  Appendix 2.  Description of the Variables
Variables Used in Section 4:
Variable Description
Fixed Assets - Property,
Plant and Equipment
(PPE)
Value of the company’s fixed assets adjusted for inflation. PPE is
measured by the non-current assets.
Sales Total value of products and services sold, minus sales returns and
discounts.  
Operating Income Sales minus operating expenses, minus cost of sales, and minus
depreciation. 
Operating Income/Sales Ratio of operating income to sales.
Net Income Operating income plus other normal incomes minus other normal
expenses. Note that extraordinary results and income taxes are
excluded.
Net Income/Sales Ratio of net income to sales.
Unit Costs Total costs of sales to sales.
Employment Total number of employees. Employees correspond to the total
number of workers who depend directly on the company.
Wages per Worker Total wage schedule paid by the firm divided by the total number of
workers who depend directly on the company.
Sales/Employment Ratio of sales to total employment.
Operating
Income/Employment
Ratio of operating income to total employment.
Prices In most cases, ratio of sales to physical output. For multiproduct
firms or firms where prices are two or three-part tariffs, it equals the
price index of the product constructed by INDEC (Instituto
Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos). This latter definition applies
only to Obras Sanitarias de la Nación, Entel, Encotel, SOMISA and
YPF.
Production Total output of the firm. For some multiproduct firms, this variable
is the ratio of total sales to prices, where prices are obtained from
the price index of the products as indicated above.
Production/Employment Ratio of production to total employment.
Investment Value of expenditure to acquire property, equipment, and other
capital assets that produce revenue (Gross Investment).
Investment/Sales Ratio of investment to sales.
Investment/Employment Ratio of investment to total employment.Variables Used in Section 5:
Variable Description
ROA Net Income/Assets.
ROE Net Income/Net Worth.
Profit Margin Net Income/Total Revenue; where Total Revenue = Financial
Income + Service Income + Irrecoverable Charges.
Operating Margin [Financial Income + Irrecoverable Charges + Service Income +
Financial Expenditures + Service Expenditures + Administrative
Expenses]/[Financial Income + Irrecoverable Charges + Other
Income].
Interest Margin [Financial Income + Financial Expenditures + Irrecoverable
Charges]/ [Loans + Public Titles].
Branches Number of branches per institution.
Employees Number of employees per institution.
Output Cash ($ + US$) + Public Titles  + Loans  + Deposits.
Administrative Expenses Expenditures in administration (includes wages, taxes, depreciation,
etc.).
Average Cost Administrative Expenses/Output.
Capitalization Capital/Assets; where Assets = Cash ($ + US$) + Public Titles +
Loans  + Participation in Other Firms + Fixed Assets + Other Assets
+ Intangible Assets + Foreign Subsidiaries.
Operating Income Financial Income + Irrecoverable Charges + Service Income
Loan Growth Logarithm of loans in year t – logarithm of loans in year t-1.